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I. The Framers' Design
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes once observed that the
Supreme Court of the United States is "distinctly American in con-
cept and function."' The High Court wields the power of judicial re-
view-the most original contribution of the United States to
constitutionalism-within the framework of the separation of powers.
It is an important piece of James Madison's wondrous clockwork de-
sign of checks and balances.2 The underlying premise of this "judicial
veto" of the legislative and executive branches, however, is that ulti-
mate sovereignty in our Republic lies with "we the people."3
The conclusion that a statute or executive action is unconstitu-
tional and thus void is grounded in the hierarchy of written laws and
the legitimacy of the judicial role. The people's will as expressed in
the Constitution controls over the will of their elected agents; it is the
duty and the province of the judicial branch to interpret and to apply
the people's highest law. This is the constitutional catechism as be-
lieved and professed by the great Chief Justice John Marshall in Mar-
bury v. Madison.4 Indeed, at the time of the founding, Alexander
1. SUPREME COURT HisToRicAL Socn=rY, THE SuPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 3 (1980) (Pamphlet prepared by the Supreme Court of the United States with the
Supreme Court Historical Society).
2. Glen Thorow stated, in commenting on the concept of judicial review:
Because the separation of powers is so central to the character of the Constitu-
tion, affecting nearly all of its provisions, the whole Federalist might be considered
a commentary on the separation of powers. The discussion of each of the particu-
lar branches of government in essays 52-83, for example, throws much light on the
separation of powers. However, the heart of the Federalist's presentation of the
separation of powers is found in essays 47-51, all written by James Madison.
These papers make the separation of powers their explicit theme.
Glen E. Thurow, The Separated and Balanced Constitution, 21 TEx. TECH L. Rv. 2389,
2391 (1990). See also Sanford Levinson, "Veneration" and Constitutional Change: James
Madison Confronts the Possibility of Constitutional Amendment, 21 TEx. TECH L. Rv.
2443, 2443 (1990) ("That the United States has a written constitution is accounted one of
its glories.").
3. See Richard D. Parker, "Here, the People Rule": A Constitutional Populist Mani-
festo, 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 531 (1993).
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide
to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1.
Hamilton promised that the proposed judicial branch "may truly be
said to have neither force nor will but merely judgment."1
5
H. A Perceived Problem
Two hundred years later, there is a growing consensus that the
Justices too often force their will on the Nation by constitutional inter-
pretation. The consensus of criticism from both sides of the political
spectrum is that modem constitutional law is indeterminate and hence
no longer legitimate.6 Critics insist that the reasoning of the Justices is
characterized by "malleability, pliability, contingency, instability, inde-
terminacy, and general uncertainty" and that their decisions are re-
solved at such high levels of abstraction that they "can make any case
or virtually any case come out any way they wish."'7 Under the guise
of robed interpreters, the Justices have become Delphic rulers.8
Before becoming Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes once observed,
"We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (emphasis in original). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, Tr LEAST DANGER-
OUS BRANCH: THE SuPREm COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); Paul W. Kahn,
Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449 (1989).
In one of the most historic exegeses of "[t]he judicial power of the United States,"
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1, Chief Justice Marshall echoed Hamilton:
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are
said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exer-
cised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is
the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the pur-
pose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving
effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824). See generally
JACK N. RAKoVE, INTERPRETiNG THE CONsTrrUrION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL IN-
TENr (1990).
6. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., The Left, The Right, and Certainty in Constitutional Law, 33
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1181 (1992) (summarizing and answering the criticisms).
7. Id. at 1181-82. See also Daniel A. Farber, Messing the "Play of Intelligence," 36
WM. & MARY L. REv. 147 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95
HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982); Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. Tnx. L.J.
383 (1985); Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1 (1983).
8. See HADLEY ARKEs, BEYO ND THm CONSTTUTION (1990); Lino A. Graglia, "Con-
stitutional Theory": The Attempted Justification for the Supreme Court's Liberal Political
Program, 65 TEX. L. REv. 789 (1987). The Justices do not merely think of the Constitution
as a protean document, rather they have come to treat it as a parchment phantasm. They
leave behind even the academic theorists. "Constitutional theory is irrelevant, that is, to
constitutional law-and the reason for the irrelevance is that the Constitution itself has
become irrelevant to constitutional law." Stephen L. Carter, Why the Confirmation Pro-
cess Can't Be Fixed, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1993); see also Stephen L. Carter, The
Confirmation Mess, Revisited, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 962 (1990).
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say it is." 9 Associate Justice Antonin Scalia recently described the
cynic's Constitution: "with five votes anything is possible." 10
I. The Inadequacy of Traditional Limits
The Framers sought to create a federal judiciary that was in-
dependent, but neither too much nor too long at odds with popular
sovereignty. Thus, the President nominates, and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, appoints Justices who "hold their offices during
good behaviour."' 1 What limits there are to be found in the text are
modest because the Framers were naive about the threat of govern-
ment by the judiciary.'
2
The House of Representatives can impeach and the Senate can
remove a Justice upon conviction of "high Crimes and Misdemean-
ors." 13 Early in our history, however, impeachment became what
9. CHARLES EvANs HUGHES, Speeches before Elmira Chamber of Commerce in 1907,
in ADDRESSES AND PAPERS 133, 139 (1908). See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, TM
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Abram
Chayes, Foreword. Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1982).
But see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword. The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L.
REv. 43 (1989).
10. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,1184-
85 (1989).
It is, of course, possible to establish general rules, no matter what theory of inter-
pretation or construction one employs. As one cynic has said, with five votes
anything is possible. But when one does not have a solid textual anchor or an
established social norm from which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement
appears uncomfortably like legislation.
Id.
11. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 1.
12. The Framers were preoccupied with cleaving the judicial branch from the execu-
tive and with empowering an independent judiciary. Also, issues of judicial federalism,
how the federal and state courts would work together, were more worrisome back then
than they are today. See generally THoMAs E. BAKER, THE GOOD JUDGE 25-36 (1989)
(Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Federal Judicial Responsibility).
A relevant legislative power remains merely a potential.
While the constitutionality and wisdom of many proposals have been debated
over the years, there is little consensus on congressional authority to reduce the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts or on how to as-
sess the efficacy of reductions in jurisdiction.... [T]here [are] virtually no limits
to be found anywhere in the Constitution to Congress's power to make excep-
tions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the original jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts.
id. at 69. See generally THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE
PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 187-92 (1994); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 379-87 (3d ed. 1988).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Under Article I, the sole power of impeachment lies with
the House of Representatives and the sole power to try all impeachments rests with the
Thomas Jefferson called "a mere scarecrow."' 4 It would be unthink-
able today for the Congress to impeach and remove a Justice because
the majority did not agree with that Justice's decisions.15
Nomination and confirmation have become the primary external
restraints on the Supreme Court.16 Historically, predicting what spe-
cific issues will come before the Court has been impossible, except in
the short term, and then in the most general terms. Furthermore, pre-
Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993). See
generally Symposium, Disciplining The Federal Judiciary, 142 U. PA. L. Rv. 1 (1993).
14. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UmTED STATES ISTORY 295
(1922). Jefferson's most developed discussion of the constitutional problems with Article
IlI tenure are to be found in his autobiography. THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY,
MEMORIAL EDrnION, in 1 WRINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 120-22 (1903). Jefferson ob-
jected to the required two-thirds vote for impeachment because it was "a vote so impossi-
ble, that our Judges are effectually independent of the nation." Id. at 120-21. Jefferson
suggested an alternative solution to retool the impeachment mechanism to make the
Judges accountable to Congress for their decisions:
I do not charge the judges with wilful and ill-intentioned error; but honest error
must be arrested, where its toleration leads to public ruin. As, for the safety of
society, we commit honest maniacs to Bedlam, so judges should be withdrawn
from their bench, whose erroneous biases are leading us to dissolution. It may,
indeed, injure them in fame or in fortune; but it saves the Republic, which is the
first and supreme law.
Id. at 122.
15. See generally Wi.LLtA H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INOuEsTs: THE ThsToRic IM-
PEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992).
Chief Justice Marshall's incumbent successor concluded that Marshall would have been
willing to abandon the practice of judicial review in order to shield the federal judiciary
and himself from legislative attacks. Id. at 118. Within a year after Marbury v. Madison,
Marshall wrote to Justice Chase to endorse the concept of a legislative veto over judicial
decisions as the lesser of the constitutional evils:
I think the modern doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate jurisdic-
tion in the legislature. A reversal of those legal opinions deemed unsound by the
legislature would certainly better comport with the mildness of our character than
a removal of the Judge who has rendered them unknowing of his fault.
Id. at 126 (quoting 3 ALBERT J. BEVERmGE, THE LsaE OF JoHN MARSHALL 177 (1919)).
See also ELEANORE BUsHNELL, CRIMES, FoLLmES, AND MISFORTUNES: Tim FEDERAL IM-
PEACHmENT TRIALS (1992). As a contemporary check on abuse of judicial power,
impeachment is impossible because it would be improper suddenly to take the
Justices to task for doing what they have long been permitted, if not encouraged
to do. Congress may someday develop sufficient will and political coherence to
declare convincingly an end to the Court's exemption from censure; such a Con-
gress, however, would probably find easier ways than impeachment to impress its
will upon the Court.
Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Mysticism The Aspirational Defense of Judicial Review, 98
HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1341 (1985) (book review).
16. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 50-56 (1991); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTnNG OF AmERiCA 345-49 (1990). The most significant internal restraint
on an individual Justice, of course, is the need to obtain the agreement of four associates.
Cf. supra note 10.
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dicting how any jurist will interpret the Constitution has been next to
impossible.17 The only regular limitations on the Court's power there-
fore amount to surreal exercises in constitutional soothsaying.
No political institution, least of all a Court composed of nine law-
yers appointed for life, should be expected to exercise near-absolute
power over such a wide range of public policy without widespread
political legitimacy. The people of the United States, from the begin-
ning, have been committed to the rule of law, to republican govern-
ment, and to a written Constitution-in short, to a Lockean system
based on the consent of the governed. The Supreme Court has led
our debates about self-government like a republican schoolmaster, but
the people ultimately have determined the outcomes.' 8 The constitu-
tional task today is to readjust the system of checks and balances to
preserve and enhance popular sovereignty.' 9
IV. A Proposed Solution
There is a constitutional solution to this problem to be found in
the text; the amending power in Article V can be used to disapprove
of individual Supreme Court decisions.20 By invoking the Article V
17. But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE Tis HONORABLE COURT 138-41 (1985).
18. See Thomas E. Baker, 10 CONST. CoMMENrARY 167, 170 (1993) (book review);
William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. Rv. 751
(1986).
19. "In the 1980's, Article V is very nearly a dead letter. The contention that it pro-
vides a realistic check on judicial activity is at best wishful thinking, certainly somewhat
naive, and at worst disingenuous." Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the
Indeterminate Text A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 842
(1985). Given these choices, color me hopeful that regular efforts to consider smaller,
negative amendments might result in a rejuvenation of the amendment process. See also
George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the United States: A Commentary, 23
Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 631 (1992); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows
at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 2121 (1990). Realistically, however, any call for judicial self-restraint is "destined
to be a vain request." JoiN AGRESTO, THE StREME COURT AND CONsTrTUmONAL DE-
MOCRACY 114-15 (1984).
20. Article V provides:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legisla-
tures of two-thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing
amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as
part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
several states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other
mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided that no amend-
ment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight
shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the
power, "WE THE PEOPLE" may exercise a "republican veto" to check
the High Court's hermeneutical tendency toward judicial oligarchy.
21
first article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal
suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
See generally HERMAN Aims, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CoNsTITUTiON OF
THE UNrrID STATES (1970); Ascs, supra note 8; RICHARD B. BEmSTEIN wrrH JEROME
AGEL, AmENDrNG AMERICA (1993); THOMAS M. DuRBrN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERV., AMENDING THE U.S. CONSITUTION: BY CONGRESS OR By CONSTITTiONAL CON-
VENTION (1992); ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION (1978); LESTER B. ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
(1942); M.A. MUsMANNo, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONsTrrunON: 1889-1928
(1929); JOHN R. VILE, REWRITING THE UNITED STATES CoNsrTrTUnON: AN EXAMINATION
OF PROPOSALS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO =n PRESENT (1991); CLEMENT E. VosE, CON-
STITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMENDMENT POLITCS AND SUPREME COURT LmGATION SINCE
1900 (1972).
21. Justice Frankfurter once delivered a lecture from the bench about the threats of
judicial oligarchy:
Even where the social undesirability of a law may be convincingly urged, invalida-
tion of the law by a court debilitates popular democratic government .... Such
an assertion of judicial power deflects responsibility from those on whom in a
democratic society it ultimately rests-the people .... But there is reason for
judicial restraint in matters of policy deeper than the value of experiment: it is
founded on a recognition of the gulf of difference between sustaining and nullify-
ing legislation. This difference is theoretical in that the function of legislating is
for legislatures who have also taken oaths to support the Constitution, while the
function of courts, when legislation is challenged, is merely to make sure that the
legislature has exercised an allowable judgment, and not to exercise their own
judgment .... In the day-to-day working of our democracy it is vital that the
power of the non-democratic organ of our Government be exercised with rigor-
ous self-restraint. Because the powers exercised by this Court are inherently oli-
garchic, Jefferson all of his life thought of the Court as "an irresponsible body"
and "independent of the nation itself." The Court is not saved from being oligar-
chic because it professes to act in the service of humane ends. As history amply
proves, the judiciary is prone to misconceive the public good by confounding pri-
vate notions with constitutional requirements, and such misconceptions are not
subject to legitimate displacement by the will of the people except at too slow a
pace. Judges appointed for life whose decisions run counter to prevailing opinion
cannot be voted out of office and supplanted by men of views more consonant
with it. They are even farther removed from democratic pressures by the fact that
their deliberations are in secret and remain beyond disclosure either by periodic
reports or by such a modern device for securing responsibility to the electorate as
the "press conference." But a democracy need not rely on the courts to save it
from its own unwisdom. If it is alert-and without alertness by the people there
can be no enduring democracy-unwise or unfair legislation can readily be re-
moved from the statute books. It is by such vigilance over its representatives that
democracy proves itself.
American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 553-56
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). Justice Frankfurter was greatly in-
fluenced by James Bradley Thayer, calling him "our great master of constitutional law,"
and calling his work, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, "the most important single essay" published on constitutional law. ALPHEus T. MA-
SON & DONALD G. STEPHENSON, JR., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 285 (8th ed.
1987); see also Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of "Our Federal-
ism", 27 GA. L. REv. 697, 730-31 (1993) (discussing Thayer's influence on Frankfurter);
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Article V represents the Framers' effort to reconcile the need for
change with the desire for stability-in Madison's words, "guard[ing]
equally against that extreme facility, which would render the Constitu-
tion too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate
its discovered faults."22
There are two steps in amending the Constitution. There are also
two alternatives for each step, arranged in what Madison described as
a procedure that is "partly federal, partly national."3 First, amend-
ments may be proposed either by a two-thirds majority in both houses
of Congress or by a special convention called at the request of two-
thirds of the state legislatures. Second, amendments are ratified by
three-fourths of the states, either by the existing state legislatures or
by special state conventions, depending on which forum Congress
designates. This is the method the Framers designed to keep the Con-
stitution in tune with the times, not judicially-inspired addenda pub-
lished in the United States Reports.24
The proposal offered here is that Congress draft amendments in
form. "The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Doe v. Roe, decided on February 25, 1993, is disapproved and set
aside."25 Congress should fix a relatively brief period for ratification.
THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989); Robert A.
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6
J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
22. THE FEDERALIsT No. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
24. "The framers and ratifiers did not want the Constitution to change in adaptation to
the economic, political, cultural, or moral developments of American society.... For them
a very different conception of constitutional law seemed appropriate. Constitutional law
was permanent law. It did not change according to circumstances." Philip A. Hamburger,
The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. Rv. 239, 325, 327
(1989).
While there is no express role for the Executive, of course, there is nothing to prevent
the President from initiating or participating in the formation of public opinion supporting
a proposal to amend the Constitution. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause,
77 GEO. L.J. 2079 (1989).
25. See generally Neil MacCormick, Why Cases Have Rationales and What These Are,
in PRECEDENT IN LAW 155-82 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
An earlier draft proposed the amendment to read, "[TIhe judgment and decision.
The choice to limit the amendment to Supreme Court decisions, and not judgments was
made to ensure that outcomes for litigants before the Court remained undisturbed. The
judgment or mandate from the Supreme Court will be the law of the case and will bind
litigants. This approach is consistent with general principles of issue preclusion, claim pre-
clusion, and finality. This approach also is reminiscent of the view Abraham Lincoln took
of the infamous Dred Scott decision. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61
Ttn. L. Rnv. 979, 984-85 (1987) (citing Lincoln's response to the Dred Scott holding, and
distinguishing a constitutional decision from the Constitution). See infra note 64.
Preferably, the ratification period would last anywhere from seven
months to one year, from the end of the Supreme Court's annual
Term in June to the beginning of the next session of Congress in Janu-
ary. This deadline will help focus public attention during these consti-
tutional moments.26
A. Arguments From First Principles
It should be enough that this proposal is provided for in the text
of our written Constitution.2 7 If somehow that is not enough, the pro-
posal is republican in that elected representatives in Congress would
26. "The Madisonian moment was special not because those participating in 'The
Founding' thought they had possessed perfect knowledge of what the new Constitution
meant, but rather because they understood the remarkable opportunity they were en-
joying." Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U. Ca. L. REv. 473,504-05 (1988).
The term "constitutional moment" describes the relatively brief but focused interlude
during which the Congress and the state legislatures first consider the constitutional appro-
priateness of recent Supreme Court decisions. This meaning is different from Professor
Ackerman's larger, more provocative thesis, see generally ACKERMAN, supra note 16, in
several important respects. First, constitutional moments according to Ackerman are
much rarer than Supreme Court overrulings. Second, under the Ackerman conception,
moments are longer, each taking place over a number of years. Finally, according to Ack-
erman, moments are far more momentous than the typical "republican veto" being con-
templated herein. See also infra note 60.
27. This proposal does not urge that text and history be ignored as does the argument
that the exercise of a line-item veto would not require a new amendment. See J. Gregory
Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Why Did President Bush Repudiate the "Inherent" Line-Item
Veto?, 9 J.L. & POL. 39,39 (1992) (discussing the executive power of line-item veto without
a constitutional amendment authorizing it).
Furthermore, implementing this proposal would not require a constitutional amend-
ment as would Senator Robert La Follette's proposal. La Follette proposed to amend Ar-
ticle V to authorize Congress to override a Supreme Court decision by a two-thirds
majority. See Jonathan L. Walcoff, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Voter Initiative Appli-
cations for Federal Constitutional Conventions, 85 COLUM. L. Rv. 1525, 1533 n.56 (citing
H.R. Doc. No. 551, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 193-94 (1929) and noting that the proposed
change "was never considered seriously."). Such a proposal might have damaged the
Court's legitimate authority. See also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of
Article V. A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE LI. 957 (1963); Note, Proposed Legislation on
the Convention Method of Amending the United States Constitution, 85 HA1v. L. Rnv. 1612
(1972).
Finally, this proposal would not harm federalism as would Senator Strom Thurmond's
"States' Rights Amendments," which would have amended Article V to allow the states to
alter the Constitution without any participation by Congress. See WARD E. Y. ELworr,
THE RISE OF GuARDIAN DEMOCRACY 133-34 (1974); see also ROBERT G. DIXON, JR.,
DEMOCRATC REPRESENATION: REAPPORTioNMENT IN LAW AND PoLmcs 419-26 (1968);
Dennis J. Mahoney, States' Rights Amendments, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTrr=TION 1757 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986) (both discussing proposed states'
rights amendments).
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act to propose a veto.28 It is representatively democratic in that either
the legislatures or the state conventions would have the final say on
ratification.29 The proposal also respects principles of majority rule
and minority rights in the supermajority requirements in Congress and
before the States. Thirty-four Senators, or 146 Representatives, or
any combination of thirteen state legislative chambers can defeat a
"republican veto," for good, bad, or no reason at all.3 0 Federalism and
separation of powers principles were built into Article V. Under our
Constitution, the people can elect representatives to amend the Con-
stitution because our government rests on the consent of the
governed.
This proposal fits neatly into the constitutional system of checks
and balances. In Article I, the President is afforded the explicit power
of an executive veto, subject to a two-thirds "override" vote in an ex-
ercise of legislative supremacy.31 In INS v. Chadha,32 the Supreme
Court invoked the separation of powers and rejected the proposition
that the legislative branch had any implicit veto power over the execu-
tive. The power of judicial review, however, may be understood to be
an implicit veto power vested in the judicial branch. But, the judiciary
should be able to "veto" Congressional and state legislative acts so
long as judicial decisions are subject to the explicit override provision
found in Article V.33 The analogy to statutory interpretation, while
imperfect, supports this approach. Congress may exercise the final
28. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539 (1988). See generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972).
29. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). See also Tip H. ALLEN, JR. &
COLEMAN B. RANSONE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1962); W.F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, 30 YALE L.J. 321 (1921); Philip L.
Martin, State Legislative Ratification of Federal Constitutional Amendments: An Overview,
9 U. RICH. L. REv. 271 (1975).
30. This much of a "nullification doctrine" is found in the supermajority requirements
within the express terms of Article V. See generally Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sover-
eignty: Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional Tradi-
tions of Canada and the United States, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1229 (1990).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
32. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See generally BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE
STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE (1988).
33. See generally ROBERT L. CLINTON, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review
(1989); SYLVIA SNOwISS, JUDICIAL REvIw AND Tn LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990);
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REvIEw: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW (1986). The Framers explicitly and repeatedly
rejected proposals to create a Council of Revision, composed of the Executive and mem-
bers of the Supreme Court, to review the wisdom and validity of proposed legislation. See
decision in interpreting what a statute means.34 On the constitutional
level, the Article V procedure gives the constitutional last word to
Congress in conjunction with the states. 5
FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDo SEcCLORUM: THE b'rELLncruAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 208, 242, 254 (1985).
To recognize as the constitutional norm that Supreme Court decisions are the
equivalent of the Constitution and can be set aside only by constitutional amendment is to
allow "the least democratic political institution [to] use its powers to govern and direct the
polity unless reversed by the one process least available to that democracy." AGEBTO,
supra note 19, at 109.
34. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); Abner J. Mikva & Jeff Bleich, When Congress Over-
rules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REv. 729 (1991); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The
Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L.
REv. 425 (1992). "It is customary to think of case-law reasoning as inductive and the appli-
cation of statutes as deductive. The thought seems erroneous but the emphasis has some
meaning." EDWARD H. LEVi, AN INTRODUCrION TO LEGAL REAsONING 27 (1972 ed.).
But cf. Gumo CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR Tim AGE OF STATUTES (1982). See also
William M. Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the Revival of "Un-
constitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1902 (1993).
One occasion for statutory overruling has to do with the so-called "Dormant Com-
merce Clause" power, by which the Supreme Court has struck down some state regulation,
even though Congress has failed to enact any federal statute preempting state law. See
generally JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 274-303 (4th
ed. 1991). It is conceded that Congress can overrule these judicial invalidations simply by
passing a statute authorizing the state regulation. MARVIN H. REDISH, THE CoNsTrrtriON
As POLITICAL STucruRE 63 (1995).
35. It is noteworthy to describe how Congress has oftentimes attempted to deviate
from a Supreme Court decision by passing a statute with the intended effect of undoing a
constitutional interpretation of the Supreme Court. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (purporting to
overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). See generally Mark E. Herrmann,
Note, Looking Down From the HilL. Factors Determining the Success of Congressional Ef-
forts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpretations of the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 543 (1992).
Congress most often claims this statutory authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Supreme Court itself has interpreted § 5
as an empowerment equivalent to the "necessary and proper clause." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 18. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 345-46 (1879). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grants the
power to enforce those provisions of the Bill of Rights which have been incorporated and
applied to the states. The prevailing understanding of the § 5 legislative power, sometimes
called the "ratchet theory," is that Congress, by statute, may give greater protection to
individual constitutional rights, but may not infringe on those minimum rights recognized
by Supreme Court interpretation. See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status
of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1230 (1978).
The most recent invocation of this power is The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). See generally Douglas Laycock & Oliver
S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEx. L. REv. 209 (1994);
Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 221 (1993);
Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Legislative Choice and Judicial Re-
view, 1993-B.Y.U. L. REv. 73 (1993). Congress used the § 5 power to disapprove of the
Supreme Court's holding in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
Winter 19951 REPUBLICAN VETO PROPOSAL
336 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:325
U.S. 872 (1990), which held that a lower, more deferential standard of review would be
applied to general exercises of the police power that impacted the free exercise of religion.
The 1993 Act called for a less deferential compelling interest test that is more protective of
free exercise rights. The new statute, however, does not overrule the Supreme Court's
holding in Smith. Rather, Congress created a new statutory right where the Supreme
Court had refused to find a constitutional right. Laycock, supra this note, at 246. This
ratchet theory may appear to be an attractive alternative to the "republican veto," but the
statutory approach is limited in application. Id. at 249-52. First, Congress cannot use the
§ 5 power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute protections of individual civil rights and liberties.
Second, any statute must comport with other provisions in the Constitution. Third, Con-
gress cannot invoke § 5 as a pretext for accomplishing policy goals unrelated to the Four-
teenth Amendment. Thus, unlike the proposed "republican veto," which is by definition
constitutionally valid once duly ratified, each turn of the statutory ratchet is subject to
substantial constitutional challenge. See Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act" Pushing the Limits of Legislation Power, 73 TEx. L. Rnv. 247 (1994). Indeed, as
this article was being edited, a United States district judge declared that the 1993 Act
violated the separation of powers and was unconstitutional. Lyle Denniston, Judge in
Texas Nullfies Religious-freedom Law, BALT. SuN, Mar. 14, 1995, at 6A.
Furthermore, there are inherent problems with the § 5 technique. Id. at 254-57. The
statute is subject to amendment, exception and avoidance by other legislation. By analogy,
the legislative and judicial history of the Anti-injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988) sug-
gests how problematic this process can be. See Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Feder-
alism: A Proposal for Reform of the Anti-Injunction Act, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 289 (1990).
Furthermore, the ratchet theory may deprive the Supreme Court of the opportunity to
reconsider the offending decision. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2240 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (expressing "doubts about
whether the Smith rule merits adherence"). But see Laycock, supra this note, at 256.
The federal dimension creates another problem. An exercise of the § 5 power to en-
force § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow the statute to restrain federal gov-
ernmental conduct. Theoretically, the equal protection/due process/reverse incorporation
holding in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), may be used to enforce legislation
against the federal government. This theory, however, would likely be unsuccessful where
the issue of race remedies is not involved. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Textually, there is
the "necessary and proper clause" to overlay onto the First Amendment; but the prohibi-
tion in the First Amendment, like the other prohibitions found in the Bill of Rights, cannot
be misread as a grant of power. Rather, proponents of the overruling statute are obliged to
invoke other, more general clauses, perhaps including the "general welfare" phrase in the
Preamble. Regardless, the constitutional theory for federal application of such a statute is
necessarily more elaborate.
Therefore, the ratchet theory is related to, but different from, the proposal of the
"republican veto" in constitutionally important ways. See generally Ira C. Lupu, Statutes
Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. Rlv. 1 (1993); Matt Pawa, Note, When
the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination
of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. Rv. 1029 (1993).
The "republican veto" endorses the proposal that Congress play a greater role in con-
stitutional decision-making by adopting "[c]ongress[ional] resolutions and other expres-
sions of congressional opinion" on constitutional issues before the Supreme Court. See
Sonsuos A. BARBER, ON WHAT TFM CONSTTUTION MEANS 205 (1984). The republican
veto does not destroy the necessity of Article V amendments because amendments under
Article V involve the states and are therefore far more authoritative than a mere
resolution.
B. Arguments from History
History and tradition play a central role in every effort to under-
stand any part of the Constitution,36 including Article V.37 Since 1789,
more than 10,000 bills have been introduced in Congress to amend the
Constitution. Of these, only thirty-three received the necessary two-
thirds votes in both houses and proceeded to the states and only
twenty-seven have received the necessary ratifications of three-fourths
of the States.38 To date, no convention for proposing amendments has
been called, and only one amendment-the Twenty-First Amend-
ment, which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment's failed experiment
with prohibition-has been ratified by state conventions.39
Proposals for amendments have been relatively numerous. It is
constitutionally significant how relatively few successful amendments
36. See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993);
Richard A. Champagne, Jr., The Problem of Integrity Tradition, and Text in Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 NEB. L. REV. 78 (1993); W. Lawrence Church, History and the Constitu-
tional Role of Courts, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1071 (1990); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and
Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990).
37. Walter Dellinger, Amending Process, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CON-
STrroTON 47 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986); John R. Vile, Constitutional Amend-
ments, in Tim OxFoRD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 181
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
38. But see Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change (Or, How Many
Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A)< 26; (B) 26; (C)>26; (D) All
of the Above), 8 CONST. COm mENTARY 409 (1991).
39. In theory, a "republican veto" amendment could bypass Congress if two-thirds of
the state legislatures call for a convention to propose such an amendment. There has not
been a successful call for such a convention since 1787 because Congress has taken action
on issues that would appeal to a large number of state legislatures. The most recent debate
in Congress over the so-called "balanced budget amendment" demonstrates how Congress
treats a proposal more seriously when the number of state applications approaches the
two-thirds requirement. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AMENDMENT OF
THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION METHOD UNDER ARTICLE V (1974); AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTrrUTE, A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: How WELL WOULD IT WORK?
(1979); RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTI-
TUTION By NATIONAL CONVENTION (1988); WILBUR EDEL, A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION: THREAT OR CHALLENGE (1981); PAUL J. WEBER & BARBARA A. PERRY,
UNFoUNDED FEARS: MYTHS AND REALITIEs OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1989);
JOHN A. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR HISTORY,
POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING (4th ed. 1972); Gerald Gunther, The Convention
Method of Amending the United States Constitution, 14 GA. L. REv. 1 (1979); John T. Noo-
nan, Jr., The Convention Method of Constitutional Amendment-Its Meaning, Usefulness,
and Wisdom, 10 PAC. L.J. 641 (1979); Kurt T. Lash, Rejecting Conventional Wisdom: Feder-
alist Ambivalence in the Framing and Implementation of Article V, 38 AMER. J. LEG. HIST.
197 (1994); Symposium on the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REv. 837 (1968).
See generally Adam Clymer, Victor of Budget Battle, Byrd Invokes An Army of Kings,
Poets and Patriots, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1994, at A16; Norman J. Ornstein, Constitutional
Crisis: Glut of Amendments Threatens Document, ROLL CALL, Mar. 10, 1994.
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there have been, by comparison, and how more often than not,
amendments have been ratified in constellations drawn to resemble
the political priorities of distinct eras in American history.40 Indeed,
constitutional amendments are the best litmus of fundamental change
in the social, economic, and political order of the United States.
Like so many other provisions in the Constitution, Article V was
the product of debate, disagreement, and compromise.41 Its sparse
language left many questions for subsequent generations to resolve
40. Dellinger, supra note 37, at 49. Between 1789 and 1804, what might be called the
"Anti-federalist" or "Jeffersonian" amendments were adopted: the first ten amendments,
popularly known as the Bill of Rights (1791), followed by the Eleventh Amendment (1795)
and the Twelfth Amendment (1804). The "Civil War Amendments," the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, were ratified during Reconstruction, in the years 1865,
1868, and 1870, respectively. The populist and progressive movements gave rise to
Amendments Sixteenth through Nineteenth, ratified between 1913 and 1920. The fourth
and most recent period lasted between 1961 and 1971 and accounted for the Twenty-Third,
Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. The few that do not fit
neatly into these temporal groupings are: Twentieth Amendment (1933), Tventy-First
Amendment (1933), TWenty-Second Amendment (1951), and the Twenty-Seventh Amend-
ment (1992). See also Daniel L. May, The Third Vice President of the United States of
Earth, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1987, at 76.
41. See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., lsr sEss.,
Is THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IN AMERICA'S FUTURE? (Comm. Print 1933).
The House Committee on the Judiciary stated:
The fact that they were overstepping their authority in writing a whole new Con-
stitution was not lost on the framers, who took care to include a way to remedy
shortcomings in the document without having to totally rewrite it. After consid-
ering several alternatives, the framers agreed upon the language now found in
Article V. The final product was a compromise between those who feared that
Congress would seek to increase Federal powers at the expense of the States, and
those who feared that the States would seek to increase their powers to thwart the
efforts of the Federal Government. As originally written, Article V vested sole
amending power in a Convention, which would be called by Congress upon appli-
cation of two-thirds of the states. Complaints that this mode threatened the
power of the Federal Government resulted in its being rewritten. On the sugges-
tion of James Madison the Convention adopted wording which gave Congress the
sole power to propose amendments, either when two-thirds of each House
deemed it necessary or when two-thirds of the states applied. This version, too,
met with disapproval from delegates who feared that Congress could simply re-
fuse to submit for ratification amendments it disapproved. Finally, the Conven-
tion compromised only hours before concluding its work. Despite the objections
of Madison who feared the power of conventions and wondered why Congress
would be more likely to call a convention than to offer amendments upon applica-
tion of two-thirds of the States, the Convention adopted the current wording
which granted the power to propose amendments jointly to the Congress and the
Convention.
The debate over Article V is not extensive and came in the waning hours of
the Convention's deliberations. It is not surprising that commentators today find
Article V's meaning vague and offer disparate interpretations of the "intent of the
framers."
Id. at 3-4.
through custom and usage.42 Practical political considerations about
specific measures, more than grand theory, have provided what an-
swers we have on many procedural issues.
43
The amendment procedure is a purely political process. The fa-
miliar "case or controversy" limitations in Article III, including the
prohibition on advisory opinions, apply to the Supreme Court's power
to interpret Article V but not to the political procedures established in
the amending language. In numerous decisions over the past two cen-
turies, the Supreme Court has maintained this distinction by respect-
ing a broad understanding of the congressional powers under Article
V.44 Indeed, the Court has invoked the political question or nonjusti-
ciability doctrine to acknowledge a constitutional prohibition against
judicial review of issues that might be considered and resolved by
Congress in the performance of its Article V responsibilities to pro-
pose amendments, to supervise the ratification process, and to pro-
mulgate amendments.45 Supreme Court majorities have consistently
and repeatedly concluded that there are no implicit limits on the con-
tent of amendments that may be proposed and ratified,4 6 thus evi-
42. See John R. Vile, Limitations on the Constitutional Amending Process, 2 CONST.
COMMENTARY 373 (1985).
43. For example, although state legislatures derive their authority to ratify amend-
ments from the Constitution, whatever procedures there are for voting, including any re-
quirement of an supermajority, are matters of state law. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221,230
(1920).
44. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (sustaining the validity of the
Eleventh Amendment; holding that the Presentment Clause does not apply to amend-
ments); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (holding two-thirds vote of quo-
rum of each house, rather than of entire membership, was sufficient to propose an
amendment); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (holding that Congress has the authority
to set reasonable time limits on state ratifications, and seven years was not unreasonable);
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) (rejecting the argument that amendments
affording the national government new direct powers over the people could be ratified
only by the people themselves in state conventions). Compare Walter Dellinger, The Le-
gitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARv. L. REv.
386 (1983) with Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We are Amending: In Defense of a Re-
strained Judicial Role, 97 HARv. L. REv. 433 (1983). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CON-
STITrONAL CHoICES 22-28 (1985).
45. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716
(1931). See generally Thomas Millet, The Supreme Court, Political Questions, and Article
V-A Case for Judicial Restraint, 23 SANTA CLARA L. Rnv. 745 (1983).
46. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (rejecting the argument that the
Eighteenth Amendment's "Prohibition" improperly interfered with the states' police pow-
ers); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (rejecting the contention that extending the
franchise to women violated the Senate's constitutional autonomy). "The constitutional
appropriateness of the substance of proposed amendments, however, is undoubtedly a mat-
ter entirely committed to judicially unreviewable resolution by the political branches of
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dencing the seeming tautology that a provision properly added to the
Constitution cannot be unconstitutional.47
Article V sets no time limit for the States to act on proposed
amendments. The Framers supposed that the ratification process
would be contemporaneous with congressional proposal and roughly
simultaneous in the States. The Constitutional Convention did not set
a deadline on ratification of the Constitution itself, but ratification ac-
tually took roughly nine months. The first set of amendments, the Bill
of Rights, was ratified in just over two years. Most amendments since
have been ratified relatively quickly-usually within eighteen and
thirty months.48 The exception is the most recent and most aberra-
tional Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which was declared ratified in
1992 after being proposed back in 1789.49 Excluding that oddity, the
government." LAURENCE H. TRImE, AimRIcAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 3-13, at 102 (2d
ed. 1988).
47. Of course, there are two entrenchment clauses in Article V: one clause, prohibiting
amendment 6f the slavery provisions, expired in 1808 and since has been superseded by the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments; the other clause is still in force and
provides, "no State without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Sen-
ate." Presumably, such provisions do not contemplate a disingenuous two-step process,
first to amend the Entrenchment Clause and then to work the change in a second amend-
ment. See GEORGE ANASTAPLo, TnE CONSTrIUTION OF 1787: A CoimmrrARY 192-95
(1989). The conceptual possibility that a provision in the Constitution is unamenable is
reminiscent of the historical requirement of unanimity for amending the Articles of Con-
federation. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U. CmI. L. Rav. 1043, 1047 (1988); Peter Suber, Population Changes
and Constitutional Amendments: Federalism Versus Democracy, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 409,
440 (1987). That provision, as a practical matter, prevented any amendments and helped
to necessitate the Constitutional Convention. Eventually, it was ignored in Article VII and
essentially negated by the political fact of ratification of the Constitution of 1787. See
generally, RATIFYING Tm CONSTrTUTION (Michael A. Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds.,
1989); Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIz. L. Rnv.
717 (1981).
48. Compare Dennis J. Mahoney, Ratification of Constitutional Amendments, in 3 EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE AmEsncAN CONsTrmON 1510, 1511 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds.,
1986) ("The average time for ratification of a constitutional amendment has been eighteen
months.") with John R. Vile, Constitutional Amending Process, in THE OxFoRD COMPAN-
ION TO THE SuPREmE COURT OF THE UNrED STATES 179-80 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds.,
1992) ("the average [period of ratification] is about two and a half years"). See also BERN-
SIN, supra note 20, at 305-07 (Appendix C contains the dates amendments were pro-
posed and ratified).
49. James Madison originally included the measure with the other proposals that be-
came the Bill of Rights. Thus, 203 years went by between the first state ratification (Mary-
land, December 19, 1789) and the 38th State ratification (Michigan, May 7, 1992). The
Archivist of the United States declared the amendment part of the Constitution pursuant
to § 106b of Title 1 of the United States Code. 57 Fed. Reg. 21,187 (May 19, 1992). Both
Houses of Congress passed resolutions declaring their assent to the new amendment. S.
Con. Res. 120, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). See generally Richard B. Bernstein, The
Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the 2wenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FOrDHAM
longest ratification took forty-eight months for the Wenty-Second
Amendment; the shortest took only four months for the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment. Several amendments have been ratified in less than a
year.50 Recently Congress has established seven-year deadlines,
although a period less than a year would be presumptively valid. 1
Congress could establish this deadline either in the joint resolution
proposing the amendment or in the text of the amendment itself.52
L. REv. 497 (1992); Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text On the Purported
7Tventy-Seventh Amendment, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 101 (1994); Michael S. Paulsen, A
General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amend-
ment, 103 YALE LJ. 677 (1993); William Van Alstyne, What Do You Think About the
7wenty-Seventh Amendment?, 10 CONST. CoMMNTARY 9 (1993).
50. The following amendments were ratified within one year of being proposed: Elev-
enth Amendment (11 months); Twelfth Amendment (7 months); Thirteenth Amendment
(11 months); Twenty-First Amendment (9 months); Twenty-Third Amendment (9 months);
and 'IWenty-Sixth Amendment (4 months). See BERNSTEiN, supra note 20, at 305-06. The
Bill of Rights, which includes the first ten amendments, was ratified twenty-seven months
after first being proposed in 1789, the first time Congress and the states used the procedure
in Article V. Id. "Exactly when the Bill of Rights took effect is a matter of some dispute."
David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 485 n.187
(1983) (elaborating on disagreements among compilers).
51. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
The concern that a "fast-track" one-year deadline would not allow for sufficient delibera-
tion for an issue of constitutional dimension is misplaced. First, actual historical experi-
ence demonstrates that a one-year ratification deadline is politically possible. Whether
there has been sufficient debate over a particular proposal can always itself be one of the
relevant political reasons for supporting or opposing the measure. A cursory examination
of those state legislatures which still follow a biennial schedule will disclose frequent, even
regular, calls for special sessions during off years. Second, some of the appeal of having
ratification periods run on for longer terms of years may be misdirected nostalgia for the
18th and 19th Century experiences. Any consideration of modern communication and
travel and the power of the media in contemporary politics suggests that one year is a
sufficient period for a national constitutional debate. If anything, a one year period is
longer than the American people's normal attention span. Third, delay would favor the
status quo against precipitous amendments on the fast track. A proposed amendment,
however, would fail if not ratified within the one year ratification deadline. Finally, while it
might arguably be sound to extend the ratification period beyond the next general election
to prevent "political grandstanding," there is no traditional or Article V requirement that
ratification deadlines be prolonged. To the contrary, there is a respectable tradition of
constitutional grandstanding vis-A-vis the amendment process down to the present day.
Further, voters are certainly free to later take into account their representatives' positions
on constitutional amendments the next time they cast their ballots for Congress and the
state legislature. Therefore, the one year deadline does not eliminate political accountabil-
ity. It ought to pass rational review under Article V.
52. The Eighteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-First, and Twenty-Second Amendments con-
tain time limits in their texts. Alternatively, Congress prescribed the time limit for adop-
tion in recent amendments, setting the limit at seven years, in the joint resolutions
proposing the amendment. When the Equal Rights Amendment expired in 1979, Con-
gress, by less than a two-thirds majority, voted to extend the deadline for another three
years. The issue of the validity of the extension was mooted by the failure of the measure
to be ratified within the extended deadline. See Bernstein, supra note 49, at 544; Adam
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The judicial branch can alter constitutional understandings
through interpretation, but the principle that the Supreme Court is
subject to the checks and balances of constitutional amendments is
demonstrated beyond peradventure by the six amendments ratified to
reverse Supreme Court holdings. 3
For present purposes, the Eleventh amendment is most important
for establishing the amending process in Article V as a means for
overruling judicial decisions than for its substantive provisions. 4 Sig-
nificantly, this was accomplished in 1795 by state legislatures and a
Congress heavily incumbent with the men who wrote and ratified Ar-
ticle V. A second historical analogy for the "republican veto" may be
found in the text of the Twenty-First Amendment, which simply states
the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment by citing it chapter and
verse, in a form very similar to that being proposed for disapproving
and setting aside Supreme Court decisions."
Kurland, Partisan Rhetoric, Constitutional Reality, and Political Responsibility: The Troub-
ling Constitutional Consequences of Achieving D.C. Statehood by Simple Legislation, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, 504 n.110 (1992).
53. The Eleventh Amendment (1795) reversed Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793), to guarantee that a state could not be sued in federal court by a citizen of
another state. The Thirteenth (1865), Fourteenth (1868), and Fifteenth (1870) Amend-
ments collectively overruled High Court rulings dealing with slavery, civil rights, and suf-
frage exemplified by the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 (19 How.) U.S. 393 (1857).
The Sixteenth Amendment (1913) effectively reversed Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust
Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), and gave the federal government the express power to tax in-
come. Most recently, in 1971, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was ratified to reverse, in
part, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), by granting the franchise to 18-year olds in
state elections. Three "reversals by implication" might be added to the list: the Seven-
teenth Amendment (1913) providing for direct elections of U.S. Senators; the Nineteenth
Amendment (1920) granting women's suffrage; and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (1964)
abolishing the poll tax in federal elections.
54. See generally CHARLES C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENrH AmENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
Inmmrry (1972). Indeed, the byzantine bizarreness of the "interpretations" of the Elev-
enth Amendment are "exhibit A" in support of the present proposal to adopt a simple
"veto" message, as opposed to an attempt to draft an affirmative statement overruling a
Supreme Court decision. The leading historian of the Amendment has concluded:
By the late twentieth century the law of the Eleventh Amendment exhibited a
baffling complexity .... "The case law of the Eleventh Amendment is replete
with historical anomalies, internal inconsistencies, and senseless distinctions."
Marked by its history as were few other branches of constitutional law, interpre-
tation of the Amendment has become an arcane specialty of lawyers and federal
judges.
J. ORTH, Tim JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNrrED STATES 11 (1987) (citations omitted),
quoted in Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 520 n.20
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. "The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is
hereby repealed." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXI.
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C. Arguments from Function
The fact that so few amendments-only 27 from among more
than 10,000 proposals-have successfully run the Article V gauntlet
can be treated as prima facie evidence that the amendment process, or
at least the historical approach, is decidedly biased against amend-
ments.56 Therefore, it is easy to discount any general threat of releas-
ing a "flood of amendments" that allegedly might threaten a
constitutional upheaval.57
At the same time, it should be noted that many constitutionally
bad ideas have deservedly failed. Important constitutional concerns
of the day are debated in Congress, in the States, and before the body
politic. Recent examples include: state legislative apportionment,
school prayer, abortion, busing, balancing the budget, and flag burn-
ing. Article V thus serves an important safety-valve function; citizens'
zeal for change is channeled into a deliberative constitutional pro-
cess. 58 At a minimum, regular repair to the "republican veto" would
serve this function.59
56. The failure of the Equal Rights Amendment is the most recent example of the
difficulty of amendment. See TRIE, supra note 46, § 16-30, at 1585-88.
An enlightening historical comparison can be drawn to the nineteenth amend-
ment, which gave women the vote. The ratification of that amendment in 1920
was the culmination of 72 years of political struggle, including 56 state referen-
dum campaigns, 480 legislative campaigns to get state suffrage amendments sub-
mitted, 47 state constitutional convention campaigns, 277 state party convention
campaigns, 30 national party convention campaigns to get suffrage planks written
into the party platforms and 19 campaigns addressed to 19 successive Congresses
to get the amendment submitted to the states.
Id. at 1587 n.8. See generally JANE J. MANSBRmGE, WHY WE LosT =n ERA (1986).
57. This is one area where Congress has proven itself constitutionally worthy. Only six
more amendments (33) have been proposed than have been ratified (27); the other 9,977-
plus bills have died in the Congress. We should expect Congress to act as responsibly with
"republican vetoes." James Madison, responding to a suggestion from Thomas Jefferson to
allow amendments to be made more easily and more frequently, wrote, "[A]s every appeal
to the people would carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent ap-
peals would, in a great measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time
bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments
would not possess the requisite stability." THm FEDERALIST No. 49 at 314 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In addition, the Constitution today is more than
two-hundred years old and deservedly much-venerated, while at least some of the Supreme
Court's interpretations are neither.
58. George Mason described the importance of this function: "The plan now to be
formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be.
Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an
easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence." 1 Tim
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVETIMON OF 1787 202-03 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
59. Taking the long view, one must conclude that the "increases in the number and
variety of demands for constitutional change reflect a strong public commitment to the
Winter 19951
344 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:325
Recently, there have been important academic arguments that
the provisions in Article V are not exclusive and that amendments
might also be proposed and adopted by other means which would
make amending the Constitution easier and more frequent.60 Those
arguments, however, certainly go beyond the text and probably go be-
yond the intentions of the Framers, 61 but they serve to highlight the
legitimacy and the propriety of the "republican veto." The "republi-
can veto" approach, by comparison to the extra-textual approach, is
consistent with the language and original meaning as well as the two
century-long functioning of Article V. The "republican veto" is
merely a variation on familiar, well-established constitutional
themes.62
Congress should impose an abbreviated deadline on the "republi-
can veto" for several reasons. First, Congress will have sufficient time
during a Supreme Court Term to evaluate recent decisions and to pro-
pose amendments before the congressional summer recess. 63 Second,
the States should be expected to act with celerity to consider an
amendment of this type, since it adds nothing affirmative, but only
vetoes a Court decision. Both the Congress and the States can rely on
the opinions of the Justices to frame the relevant issue. Third, the
Constitution as much as they do growing public discontent with the actual workings of the
constitutional system." BERNSTEIN, supra note 20, at xiv. See also Donald J. Boudreaux &
A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional
Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 111 (1993).
60. See Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.L 1013 (1984); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.
453 (1989); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed. Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revis-
ited. Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. Rv. 1043 (1988); Levin-
son, supra note 2, at 2460. See also supra note 35.
61. My own view of Article V is that it means what it says, and it says all that it means.
David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76
IOWA L. REv. 1 (1990).
62. See George Anastaplo, The Constitution at Two Hundred: Explorations, 22 TEx.
TECH L. REv. 967, 1053-60 (1991).
63. See Sup. Ct. R. 3 ("a continuous annual Term commencing the first Monday in
October"); 28 U.S.C. § 2 (1993).
Of course, Congress has many other important responsibilities, but as a co-equal
branch, it should give priority to how it participates in the constitutional dialogue. As a
practical matter, we could expect Congress to perform this role as it otherwise generally
conducts itself: through designated committees and with the assistance of staff. A serious
proposal to amend the Constitution has at least as much a claim on the Congress as the
matter of impeaching and removing a single errant interpreter, such as a lower court fed-
eral judge. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DIscIpLNm & RE-
MOVAL 32-68 (1993); BAKER, supra note 12, at 64-70. If experience proves the abbreviated
timetable to be too short, there is nothing but impudence and politics to prevent Congress
from taking more time.
short ratification period will serve to reduce the likelihood of a
"flood" of "republican vetoes." Amendments of the type being pro-
posed are perhaps best limited to decisions of the Supreme Court
from the most current Term in order to protect the integrity of stare
decisis. 4 This sort of congressional self-restraint would respect the
64. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2808-09 (1992) with id. at
2881 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Consider the argument made by Abraham Lincoln:
And now as to the Dred Scott decision .... It was made by a divided court-
dividing differently on the different points. Judge [Stephen A.] Douglas does not
discuss the merits of the decision; and, in that respect, I shall follow his example,
believing I could no more improve on McLean and Curtis, than he could on
Taney.
He denounces all who question the correctness of that decision, as offering
violent resistance to it. But who resists it? Who has, in spite of the decision,
declared Dred Scott free, and resisted the authority of his master over him?
Judicial decisions have two uses-first, to absolutely determine the case de-
cided, and secondly, to indicate to the public how other similar cases will be de-
cided when they arise. For the latter use, they are called "precedents" and
"authorities."
We believe, as much as Judge Douglas, (perhaps more) in obedience to, and
respect for the judicial department of government. We think its decisions on
Constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control, not only the particu-
lar cases decided, but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed
only by amendments of the Constitution as provided in that instrument itself.
More than this would be revolution. But we think the Dred Scott decision is
erroneous. We know the court that made it, has often over-ruled its own deci-
sions, and we shall do what we can to have it to over-rule this. We offer no resist-
ance to it.
Judicial decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents, according to
circumstances. That this should be so, accords both with common sense, and the
customary understanding of the legal profession.
If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of
the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with legal
public expectation, and with the steady practice of the departments throughout
our history, and had been in no part, based on assumed historical facts which are
not really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more
than once, and had there been affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of
years, it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, to
not acquiesce in it as a precedent.
But when, as it is true we find it wanting in all these claims to the public
confidence, it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to
treat it as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country ....
Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in II Trm CoLLEcrED WoRss oF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 400-01 (R. Basler ed., 1953). See also Speech at Chicago, Illinois (July 10, 1858)
in id. at 494-96. See generally AGREsTO, supra note 19, at 90-92.
Likewise, we should expect that Congress will exhibit some self-restraint and common
sense at the opposite extreme. A proposal to disapprove of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), simply would not do. But see Neil B. Cohen, What if There Were No
Judicial Review?, in WHAT IF THERE WEIE No WPTFEN CONSTITUTION AN BILL OF
RIGHTS? (Herbert M. Levine ed., 1992). In between these extremes, prudence ought to
govern. For example, while he was Solicitor General, Erwin Griswold routinely instructed
his assistants never to cite to a Supreme Court decision more than 25 years old. His theory
was that, if the proposition was still "good law," other recent precedent could be found and
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separation of powers and would preserve the independent federal ju-
diciary guaranteed in Article III. Congress should not rely on the "re-
publican veto" so often or so boldly as to encroach on the core judicial
function.65
It would be up to Congress whether to add an express require-
ment that each of the fifty states actually vote on the proposal before
the end of the specified time period. The second step in Article V is a
textual recognition of the states' power to choose whether to ratify or
to reject any proposed amendment. This power, however, has not al-
ways been honored. Ratification of the Fourteenth amendment was
secured, in part, because Congress made ratification a condition pre-
cedent to readmission for the states of the former Confederacy. 66 The
Reconstruction Congress operated at, if not beyond, the outermost
limits of Article V. Perhaps this exercise of a power, dictating ratifica-
tion to the sovereign states, includes a lesser power to require that
each state ratify or reject a duly proposed amendment before a stated
deadline, without dictating the actual vote of any State.67 Imposing
if not, then it was probably no longer the law. Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Thomas
E. Baker (February 22, 1994). See infra notes 84 & 97.
65. See Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Constitution Outside the Courts, 14 CARDozo
L. REv. 1287 (1993).
66. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THm FOURTEENmH AMENDMENT 40-63 (1988). See also
Herman Belz, The Constitution and Reconstruction, in THE FACTS OF RECONSTRUCrION
189 (Eric Anderson & Alfred A. Moss, Jr. eds., 1991).
67. An argument may be made that for Congress to impose a requirement that state
legislatures conduct an actual vote within the one-year deadline is beyond the powers of
Congress and unconstitutional. This argument might be based on Article V itself, which
strictly delimits the power of Congress over the amendment procedures. Under this ra-
tionale, however, the Supreme Court would be obliged to deal with the unmistakable his-
tory of the Fourteenth Amendment and 200-plus years of rather deferential precedents.
The argument might be based, alternatively, on the Tenth Amendment or the Guaranty
Clause. The Tenth Amendment is dead letter for the present intents and purposes. The
Guaranty Clause is nonjusticiable and judicially off limits for the most part. See infra notes
88 & 97. For some time now, and likely for some time to come, the operative rule of
constitutional law in the Supreme Court is that states lose and Congress wins, although
there are rare rule-proving exceptions. Compare U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 112
S. Ct. 1415 (1992) (the rule) and South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) with New York
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (the exception).
A more interesting, and less certain, issue is how Congress could influence a recalci-
trant state legislature. Federal "carrots and sticks" are commonplace. Congress sometimes
simply commands what it wants done or not done, and relies on federal criminal or civil
sanctions for enforcement. Other times, Congress attaches strings to federal funds to ac-
complish its bidding on everything from affirmative action in higher education to minimum
drinking ages and interstate highways. Often, what Congress wants done requires the sov-
ereign state legislature to act. Finally, Congress might simply acquiesce and interpret a
failure to answer by the deadline as a "no" on the measure. The feature of requiring a vote
by each state is not absolutely necessary for the "republican veto."
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such a mandatory voting requirement on the states would render the
relatively short deadline suggested far more feasible. Such a require-
ment would also have the desirable effects of focusing attention on the
particular "republican veto" and further reducing the likelihood that
too many or untoward amendments would be ratified.
The constitutional beauty of this proposal for negative amend-
ments is that it is ideologically neutral, regardless of the divisiveness
of the issue. Hypothetically, those of a pro-life persuasion could have
vetoed Roe v. Wade,68 the 1973 decision affording a pregnant woman a
fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy. Hypothetically, those
of a pro-choice persuasion could have vetoed Harris v. McRae,69 the
1980 decision that denied an indigent woman the right to a govern-
ment-provided abortion.
The limits on this technique are ultimately political and contex-
tual. One might speculate that had this been the approach when
Plessy V. Ferguson7° was decided, the "republican veto" could have
prevented the whole regime of "Jim Crow" and would have withheld
the constitutional imprimatur on racial apartheid. Such a revisionist
Alternatively, Congress could direct the proposed amendment to the attention of con-
ventions in the states. In 1933, Congress submitted the Twenty-First Amendment, which
repealed prohibition, to state conventions. This is the only occasion on which this option
has been designated. In almost every state, elections of delegates to the ratifying conven-
tion amounted to a referendum on the proposal. It is also noteworthy that all this was
accomplished in less than ten months. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 306. This is histor-
ical precedent for the Congress, if the extraordinary majority see fit, to submit a "republi-
can veto" to a similar arrangement of state by state referenda. See generally Constitutional
Convention Procedures, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 31 & Sept. 23, 1985). The
relative ease and unquestioned representativeness of the convention method have much to
recommend.
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. 448 U.S. 287 (1980). The textual examples raise a more general question. Sup-
pose, for example, that a negative amendment that disapproved of Harris was ratified in a
timely fashion. Would that amendment have the constitutional effect of immunizing Roe
from being overruled, either by the Supreme Court or by a subsequent "republican veto"?
The answer to this question is "no" because properly understood, the negative amendment
stands only for the explicit disapproval of the designated decision. The design of the "re-
publican veto" proposal does not contemplate what logicians call a negative pregnant
proposition. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, through the power of judicial review,
should be able to sort out the meaning and effect of a negative amendment. The Court
demonstrates as much when it overrules one of its own precedents. See also infra note 97
(discussing political question doctrine decision making). Finally, the relevance and influ-
ence of an earlier negative amendment in a later debate over a related "republican veto" is
best left to the Article V political process in Congress and the states. See also supra note
64 (concerning the validity of an argument based on the passage of time, settled expecta-
tions, and societal reliance).
70. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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speculation, however appealing, is fraught with presentism and is both
unrealistic and ahistorical. At the same time, one should worry that
the "republican veto" might have been used to set aside Brown v.
Board of Education in 1954.71 The so-called "Southern Manifesto"
expressed the view that the Brown holding was "unwarranted" and
the 101 members of Congress who were signatories solemnly and omi-
nously pledged "to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of
this decision which is contrary to the Constitution."72 It is noteworthy
that those sentiments did not even come close to the extra-majorities
required to propose and ratify an amendment, despite the level of
controversy and the intensity of the opposition at the time. The Arti-
cle V procedures have proved to be sufficient safeguards against unto-
ward vetoes of Supreme Court decisions.
Gauging the threat of this proposal to civil liberties and civil
rights is important yet difficult. The very existence of the Article V
procedure, however, represents the exact same potential threat. In
theory, even preferred freedoms could be eliminated by a properly
proposed and duly ratified amendment. The remote likelihood of
such an occurrence should be a matter of common sense and constitu-
tional faith. The same conclusion can be reached about the "republi-
can veto:" the proposal relies on using the existing, proven procedures
in Congress and before the states, with their built-in extra-majority
requirements. The worry that coalescing factions would succeed in
destroying the First Amendment can be dismissed as far-fetched. Re-
cent scholarship has suggested that the Supreme Court itself might
exercise some extra-textual power to void any amendments that
would take away the most fundamental rights or that would entrench
on the essential role of the third branch.73 Such a fail-safe, however,
will not be necessary because the "republican veto" will not occasion
this sort of constitutional showdown. After all, the Bill of Rights itself
owes its very existence to the Article V procedure, and the empirical
71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
72. 102 CONG. REC. 4515-16 (1956). See RiCHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THm
HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality 752-
53 (3rd ed. 1987).
73. Walter Murphy, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing,
in ESSAYS ON THE CoNsTITUTION OF T=E UNrnnD STATES 130 (M. Judd Harmon ed.,
1978); Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Foreword: Antidiscrimination and
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REv.
80, 113 n.87 (1991); Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?,
100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073 (1991). These "arguments should be rejected and courts should
steer clear of imposing implicit limits on the substance of amendments, even in the extreme
circumstances" these scholars imagine. Vile, supra note 42, at 381-82.
experience with Article V since 1791 further supports this
conclusion.74
The proposal here is best understood as protective of fundamen-
tal rights, especially because of its case-specific quality. Consider a
recent case history. In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Texas v.
Johnson,75 holding that the Constitution protected the act of publicly
burning a United States flag as a means of political protest. It did so
by a narrow five to four majority, and over strident dissents. Reac-
tions in the Congress, from the White House, and in public opinion,
were immediate and angry. Bills were introduced in Congress to
change the language of the First Amendment. Many defenders of the
Court and the Constitution worried that overwhelming public support
would allow those proposals to succeed with the consequence that set-
tled, even sacred, understandings of free speech might be undone. A
federal statute was offered to placate public opinion, 76 but the
Supreme Court the very next year held the statute unconstitutional.
In overruling the statute, the Supreme Court relied on the same rea-
soning as in Texas v. Johnson and voted according to the same divided
vote.77 The whole episode shed more heat than light on our basic
charter.
Had Congress invoked the "republican veto" in the aftermath of
the Johnson case, the nation would have fared much better. Debate
74. While amendments might threaten civil rights and civil liberties in theory, a review
of the more than 10,000 amendments considered since the Constitution was adopted indi-
cates that only a few would have limited rights. John R. Vile, Proposals to Amend the Bill
of Rights: Are Fundamental Rights in Jeopardy?, 75 JuDICATuRE 62 (1991). Those added
measures proposed by Congress and ratified by the states, by and large, have extended
individual liberties. Id.
75. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
76. Professor Karst's assessment is most apt:
Let me suggest a two-sentence opinion that might have disposed of the secondflag case:The only real purpose in enacting this law was to dramatize some
politicians' devotion to the flag. Sending people to jail for political ex-
pression is a serious business, and we are unwilling to do that just to
allow the Congress and the President to take a curtain call.
Of course, the majority opinion was more restrained.
Kenneth L. Karst, Faiths, Flags, and Family Values: The Constitution of the Theater State, 41
UCLA L. REv. 1, 3 (1993). See also Frank Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On Constitu-
tional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1337 (1990). That the measure was a statute created
additional problems. Mark E. Herrmann, Note, Looking Down from the Hil" Factors De-
termining the Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpretations of
the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 543, 544-45 (1992); see also supra note 35.
77. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). The incident raised in the mind of
one student of the Constitution "the bizarre possibility of an unconstitutional amendment
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over the measure could have diffused the public's reaction. In the
supposed worst-case scenario for civil liberties-if a veto measure had
been proposed and ratified-a single 5 to 4 Supreme Court decision,
without which the nation had survived for 200 years, would have been
overruled; but, the First Amendment, without which the United States
would not have been the country that it has been over the last two
centuries, would have been preserved in whole and intact.
D. Arguments from Role
Would the nation adapt to the regular overruling of Supreme
Court decisions? If the practices of the Court itself are any indication,
there is little to fear.78 The Supreme Court has overruled as many of
its own prior decisions during the author's lifetime as it did during the
previous 160 years of the Republic.79 By their own count, the Justices
have overruled in whole or in part thirty-four of their previous consti-
tutional decisions in the last twenty years.80 If the guardians of the
Constitution themselves do not perceive a threat in this frequency of
overrulings, others should not be heard to raise a hue and cry against
against proposing republican vetoes from time to time.8 1  The
Supreme Court once claimed for itself the mantle of judicial
supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron82 and equated its opinions with the text
of the Constitution. Of course, this judicial rhetoric was necessary to
78. The technique itself is not wholly unlike a citation technique the Supreme Court
has used in UNITED STATES REPORTS. Following Brown, the Court applied desegregation
to a multitude of public activities beyond education in brief per curiam opinions, some
merely citing Brown. E.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (per curiam); State Ath-
letic Commissioner v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (per curiam); New Orleans City Park
Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam); Holmes v. City of Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per
curiam); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (per curiam). A
one-citation per curiam opinion was also used to reverse obscenity convictions, even
though the Justices could not agree on a rationale. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 82 n.8 (1973) (Brennan, I., dissenting) (citing more than thirty cases that were
"Redrup-ed").
79. DAviD O'BRmN, STORM CENTER 63 (3d ed. 1993). See generally Christopher P.
Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent. An Analysis of Natural Courts and Reversal
Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262 (1992).
80. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-30 n.1 (1991) (counting 33 decisions). See
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (34th constitutional overruling since
decided).
81. See generally Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV.
J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 23 (1994); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudi-
cation, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opin-
ions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REv. 1 (1979).
82. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
the times if not the decision . 3 Supreme Court opinions help the peo-
ple to discover faults in the Constitution and to deliberate and decide
when to seek correction before the Court or through the amendment
process.84 Nonetheless, there is a distinction between drafting and de-
bating an amendment of the text, which obliges full discussion and
elaboration, and merely setting aside a single reported opinion of the
Supreme Court!' The smaller constitutional task can be accom-
plished with an economy of words and within an abbreviated time
period.
Indeed, the best use of this "republican veto" would be to set
aside a Supreme Court decision that itself overrules a prior decision.
This would have the immediate effect of reinstating the preferred ear-
lier interpretation. For example, Congress and the state legislatures
by vetoing either National League of Cities v. Usery86 or Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,87 could have settled the de-
83. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CoNFLicr 285-310 (1992); Daniel H.
Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1983 U. ILL.
L. REv. 387 (1983); Louis Fisher, The Curious Belief in Judicial Supremacy, 25 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 85 (1991). See generally Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court
Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REv. 991 (1987).
84. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THm INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION 7 (1992). The method ad-
vocated here is similar to the Supreme Court practice of policing its own precedents. Con-
sider two modem examples. Within five years of the only majority opinion invalidating
state legislation under the privileges and immunities clause, the decision was overruled.
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940), overruling in part Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404
(1935). A 1976 majority, in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), chose between two
indistinguishable state action decisions. The members of the Court deciding those two
cases, however, had previously reconciled them with an earlier decision. These instances of
unravelling and reweaving stare decisis did not seem to threaten the Republic, and today
are an accepted part of the hombookery of constitutional law. See Jom E. NowAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSrTrUiONAL LAW § 11.2, at 359 n.20 & § 12.2, at 460-61 (4th ed.
1991). Interestingly, in both these instances older and more established precedents were
overturned than is being recommended for the "republican veto." See supra note 64.
85. The "republican veto," negating a Supreme Court decision, would be somewhat
analogous to a practice and procedure used by many state appellate courts to withdraw a
previously published opinion, a technique sometimes labelled "depublication." See gener-
ally Philip L. Dubois, The Negative Side of Judicial Decision Making: Depublication as a
Tool of Judicial Power and Administration on State Courts of Last Resort, 33 ViLL. L. REV.
469 (1988); Paige Merrill Baker, Comment, Depublication: The New Starchamber, 18 W.
ST. U. L. Rnv. 313 (1990). The Federal Circuit often enters a "vacatur" to vacate the
judgment and opinion of the district court, usually upon the motion of the parties as part of
a settlement agreement. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir.
1992), cert granted sub nom. Kaisha v. Philips Corp., 113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993), cert. dis-
missed, 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993). See generally Michael W. Loudenslager, Note, Erasing the
Law: The Implications of Settlements Conditioned upon Vacatur or Reversal of Judgments,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1229 (1993).
86. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
87. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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bate over the Tenth Amendment, at least for this generation. That
would have avoided the constitutional consternation that resulted
from the Court's yo-yoing of its own precedents .
8
This usage to set aside judicial overrulings has the potential to
reclaim valuable constitutional precedent at only an incremental cost
to the Court as an institution.8 9 The Supreme Court's recent internal
debate over stare decisis for constitutional questions is instructive and
provides Congress with some helpful criteria to consider in deciding
whether to veto a Supreme Court decision. Such criteria include the
narrowness of the margin of the decision, the persuasiveness of the
dissents, the lack of allegiance by present members of the Court, the
difficulty of consistent application by the lower courts and subsequent
Supreme Courts, the extent of reliance on the ruling within the legal
community and in society at large, how related doctrines have affected
the ruling, and whether the facts and assumptions relied on in the de-
cision have been overcome by subsequent developments.90 The de-
bate over the particular proposal ought to take place on this level of
pragmatic argumentation, with full consideration afforded to all rele-
vant and prudential factors, 91 including the threshold assumption that
there is a higher burden for constitutional change than for legislative
matters. Constitutional politics ought to claim the best wisdom of our
nation, expressed through the Congress and the state legislatures.
88. See Philip P. Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare Decisis and the Overruling of
National League of Cities, 2 CONST. CovmErNrARY 341 (1985). See generally Maurice Kel-
man, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 Sup. C. REv. 227 (1985); Earl M. Maltz, Some
Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467
(1980). Of course, precedent is not the only input for Supreme Court decision making and
there may be some conflict between precedent and the others. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HAv. L. Rnv.
1189 (1987).
89. There is an imperfect but relevant correspondence between the inquiry into consti-
tutional stare decisis and the Article V inquiry into the appropriateness of proposing and
ratifying a "republican veto." Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1344,
1361 (1990). See also Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization,
in PRECEDENT IN LAW 183-216 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
90. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2808-09 (1992); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,827-30 (1991). See also generally Michael
J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 68 (1991); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. RIv. 367 (1988);
Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United States Supreme
Court, 1900-90,21 HoFsTRA L. REv. 667 (1993); Geoffrey Stone, Precedent, the Amendment
Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67 (1988).
91. "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be
changed for light and transient causes." Ti DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2
(U.S. 1776).
How can the Supreme Court be expected to act in response to the
exercise of the "republican veto" if the practice becomes routine? If
an amendment is proposed by Congress and ratified by the states,
then the Court is oath-bound92 to respect the outcome of the political
process.93 In fact, each time Article V has been relied on to overrule a
Supreme Court decision, the Justices have adhered to their oaths.94
The Supreme Court, no less than the political branches, must adhere
to the rule of law; indeed, the Court as an institution has the most to
lose under the rule of man.9
5
The constitutional dialogue would be enhanced by regular repair
to the "republican veto. ' 96 Under settled understandings of the prin-
ciple of separation of powers, the decisions when and what to propose
and ratify in a "republican veto" are wholly given over to the Article
V procedures. The judicial task of interpreting any amendment, in-
cluding a new amendment setting aside a specific Court decision, nec-
92. "Why otherwise does [the Constitution] direct the judges to take an oath to sup-
port it?" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). The
Justices take an oath to uphold the Constitution, "'not the gloss which [the Supreme Court]
may have put on it."' South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (quoting William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 736 (1949)).
93. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
94. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (Eleventh Amendment); The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (Thirteenth Amendment); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Fourteenth Amendment); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953) (Fifteenth Amendment); William E. Peck & Co. v. Lower, 247 U.S. 165 (1918) (Six-
teenth Amendment); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (Nineteenth Amendment);
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (T1wenty-Fourth Amendment). See supra note
53.
95. See Morrison v. Olson, 427 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is the
proud boast of our democracy that we have 'a government of laws and not of men."');
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175 (1989). See
generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 349 (1992);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. Rnv.
422 (1988).
96.
Nothing in the Constitution itself, of course, specifies that a search for consensus
must play a paramount constitutional role. In significant part, the Constitution
creates a process less of consensus than of controlled conflict. The regime it cre-
ates gives a central place to a judiciary that speaks not always in one voice but
often in many, and whose pronouncements are best understood not as final an-
swers but as parts of an ongoing discourse-a discourse with the other levels and
branches of government, with the people at large, with courts that have gone
before and courts yet to be appointed. It is this constitutional discourse, and the
role it plays in subjecting governmental practices to continuing critique in terms
of our fundamental law, that gives the institution of judicial review such legiti-
macy as it may enjoy.
TRmE, supra note 46, § 3-6, at 66. See also Jom4 E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSrrrUTONAL LAW § 2.15(2), at 109-11 (4th ed. 1991).
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essarily resides with the Supreme Court, as does the continuing
obligation to interpret the scope of the underlying provision of the
Constitution.97 The implied veto of judicial review is subject to the
explicit veto of Article V, but the awesome responsibility to interpret
the Constitution will remain with the Supreme Court. Once ratified, a
"republican veto" will become part and parcel of the same constitu-
tional dynamic.98 Arguably, an amendment that is negative should be
97. This process of post-adoption interpretation resembles the Supreme Court's appli-
cation of the political question or nonjusticiability doctrine: a textual commitment of an
issue within the power of one of the two coordinate political branches makes the matter
off-limits to the judicial branch; likewise, the power of judicial review obliges the Supreme
Court to determine whether there is such a textual commitment and to define the scope of
the power of judicial review. The Court's conclusion, however, omits whether the Consti-
tution allows for judicial review of the result of the political process. Compare Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) with Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
The Supreme Court similarly will determine the meaning and application of the "re-
publican veto" amendment. A "republican veto" amendment will present the Supreme
Court with important and often difficult interpretation issues. For example, each time the
Court deliberates on an issue subsequently affected by a "republican veto," the Court will
need to decide whether the amendment repudiating the specified decision also repudiates
the general principle underlying the disapproved decision. If so, the negative amendment
could be understood to be much broader than a narrow provision merely setting aside a
single decision. Opponents of the proposal likely will have made that negative pregnant
argument in their unsuccessful efforts against ratification, making it part of the legislative
history of the measure. Proponents likely will have rejected such arguments, and their
debate will be part of the record as well. Thus the Supreme Court will need to conclude
whether the general underlying principles that, in the Justices' views, led to the disap-
proved decision, were nonetheless left undisturbed by the negative amendment.
A controversial example illustrates this point. Suppose that shortly after Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), a "republican veto" was ratified disapproving of the decision. The
Supreme Court could easily and legitimately conclude that the right of privacy underlying
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), had been left undisturbed. Such arguments
over applications of principles are found elsewhere in the field of constitutional law. See
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Theoretically, it also would be possible for the
Court to reconsider the disfavored precedent under arguments that previously were not
addressed if they were properly presented in a subsequent case. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at
188 n.l, 196 n.8.
The interpretive dilemma presented by a "republican veto" is not any different from
that confronted by the Court daily. The perennial debate over the meaning and intent
behind the Fourteenth Amendment that has raged in the UNITED STATES REPoRTs and the
law reviews from 1868 to the present illustrates the interpretation problems the Court is
typically confronted with. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993). This is consistent with the role of the
Supreme Court as proclaimed by Justice Jackson, "We are not final because we are infalli-
ble, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). If the Supreme Court "just doesn't get it," a second "re-
publican veto" disapproving of the decision interpreting the previous negative amendment
would be theoretically possible. Such a second veto, however, would be less likely given
the attention span of public opinion and elected officials.
98. There is no reason why the Supreme Court's interpretive methodology should be
different for a "republican veto." See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy,
preferred over an amendment that attempts affirmatively to state a
new constitutional rule for decision. What is needed is a different in-
terpretation, not different language.99 In our constitutional theater,
the Supreme Court always will perform center stage, but Article V
makes Congress the director, and the people in the states the play-
wrights. A "republican veto" will oblige the Justices to reinterpret
their part as they perform their ongoing role. This is a constitutionally
creative collaboration which is textually preferred over the common
law methodology within the exclusive domain of the Justices.10°
If a particular "republican veto" is proposed by the Congress but
fails ratification, the Supreme Court will benefif from the views of a
coordinate branch and may choose to revisit the area on its own. m1 -
Even bills that fail in Congress provide some modest dialogue appro-
99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990). But see Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990) (State
Supreme Court holding that initiative process could not be used to implement a fundamen-
tal change in the framework of state government); Walter F. Murphy, Staggering Toward
the New Jerusalem of Constitutional Theory: A Response to Ralph F. Gaebler, 37 Am. J.
JURIS. 337 (1992).
99. Consider Professor Levi's insight:
It may be suggested that the doctrine should be otherwise; that as with legislation
so with a constitution, the interpretation ought to remain fixed in order to permit
the people through legislative machinery, such as the constitutional convention or
the amending process, to make a change. But the answer lies not only in the
difficulties of obtaining an amendment, nor the difficult position of a court which
obdurately refuses to interpret common words in a way ordinary citizens believe
to be proper. The more complete answer is that a written constitution must be
enormously ambiguous in its general provisions. If there has been an incorrect
interpretation of the words, an [affirmatively stated] amendment would come
close to repeating the same words. What is desired is a different emphasis, not
different language. This is tantamount to saying that what is required is a differ-
ent interpretation rather than an amendment.
LEvi, supra note 34, at 42. See also supra note 54.
100. Professor Levi discounts the need for what might be labelled "a foolish consis-
tency," and explains the desirability of constitutional back-and-forth:
Thus constitutional interpretation cannot be as consistent as case-law develop-
ment or the application of statutes. The development proceeds in shifts; occasion-
ally there are abrupt changes in direction. Within a period and a subject matter
there will be some consistency. The training of judges is reasoning by example in
any event, and within certain areas cases will be compared and developed. Con-
sistency cannot be overlooked entirely. The word of Justice Roberts is evidence
of that. His change in vote produced one of the most dramatic shifts in recent
Supreme Court history; yet he later was to complain that too many reversals tend
"to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad
ticket, good for this day and train only." [Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669
(1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).] There will be some consistency, but it is not the
consistency of case law or statute.
LEvi, supra note 34, at 42 (footnote omitted).
101. An amendment dealing with child labor was proposed in response to Supreme
Court holdings, but failed ratification and became unnecessary when the Court reversed
earlier holdings. See United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
Winter 19951 REPUBLICAN VETO PROPOSAL
356 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:325
priate for the Supreme Court to hear, if not to heed. Such is the con-
stitutional tradition expressed in Article V.1a
V. A Final Argument
The Constitution of the United States is now in its third century.
The oldest written and continuous constitution in the world, it has sur-
vived far longer than even the most optimistic of its 18th-century
Framers imagined. The Supreme Court has necessarily performed a
most critical role throughout this constitutional history. But Article V
is the procedure designed with republican genius and with the hope to
avoid the awesome choice stated in the Declaration of Independence
"to alter or to abolish" the government.10 3 The Framers so tasked
themselves and their posterity.
Our constitutionalism obliges "wE Ti= PEOPLE" to keep the
promise of the Preamble to "form a more perfect Union" by amend-
ing the written version of our social compact. Each generation bears
the sovereign responsibility to preserve the integrity of the text as a
means towards the end of self-government. 1°4 We cannot allow the
102. See Akhil R. Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97
YALE L.J. 281, 291-92 (1987); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate" A Guide for the
Perplexed, 49 Oauo ST. L.J. 1085, 1097 (1989).
For me, signing the Constitution commits one not to closure but only to a process
of becoming, and to taking responsibility for constructing the political vision to-
ward which I, joined, I hope, with others, strive. It is less a series of propositional
utterances-for I, at least, have proved singularly unsuccessful in reducing the
Constitution to some essentialist distillation - than a commitment to taking
political conversation seriously. I would want to distinguish this from an entirely
"Article V" view of the Constitution, however, because I do indeed believe that
the Constitution is best understood as supportive of such conversations and of
government predicated on respect for their maintenance.
Sanford Levinson, Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion; Or, Would You Sign the Constitu-
tion?, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 113,143-44 (1987). See also Marcia Coyle, How Americans
View High Court, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 26,1990, at 12; Louis Fisher, Looking for the Last Word,
LEGAL Tnvms, Aug. 7, 1989.
103. THE DECLARATON OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See WOOD, supra
note 29, at 613. "In sum, amending provides the opportunity to modify the Constitution so
as to prolong the effectiveness of our two-hundred-year-old charter and avoid its wholesale
abandonment." David E. Kyvig, Alternative to Revolution: Two Hundred Years of Consti-
tutional Amending, in THE EMBATrLED CONSTIUION: VrrAL FRAMEwoRK OR CONVE-
NIENT SYMBOL 135, 148 (Adolph H. Grundman ed., 1986).
104. "Each generation of Americans must define what it means to be an American."
We Force the Spring: Transcript of [Inaugural] Address by President Clinton, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 21, 1993, at A15. See generally PAUL EIDELBERG, TnE PHILosopHY OF TiE AmERi-
CAN CONsTI-UImoN: A REINTERPRETATION OF T INTENTIONS OF Tim FOUNDING FA-
THERS (1968).
Constitution to be deconstructed into post-modem meaninglessness' 0 5
as a result of either judicial usurpation or republican abdication. 10 6 At
the close of the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin was
asked what kind of government the people were getting. He replied,
"A Republic, if you can keep it."' 7 The Constitution needs the "re-
publican veto" today.., to keep it a Republic.
105. See John Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Constitution, 40 STAN. L. REv. 181 (1987).
In constitutional law, "brilliant scholarship has recently become rampant," but there is "a
flaw endemic to brilliant constitutional theories:"
Most theories of constitutional law rest on some notion of the consent of the
governed, either through tacit institutional acquiescence or through some kind of
social contract theory. A brilliant theory is by definition one that would not occur
to most people. It is hard to see how the vast majority of the population can be
presumed to have agreed to something that they could not conceive of. Who
would know better than the average person what the average person has con-
sented to? How can someone have consented to a position that is so novel and
clever that only one person on earth has ever thought of it?
Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MunN. L. RPv. 917, 924-25 (1986).
106. "Our peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitution. Let us not
make it a blank paper by construction." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C.
Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), reprinted in THE PoLrcAL WRrriNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
144 (Edward Dumbauld ed., 1955). Jefferson had no fondness for judicial review:
His faith in improvement found its constitutional home in the amending system
adopted as part of the Constitution. He argued that "the real friends of the con-
stitution in its federal form, if they wish it to be immortal, should be attentive, by
amendments, to make it keep pace with the advance of the age in science and
experience." This process would allow peaceful change and demonstrate how our
superior system of government moved forward ....
Charles T. Cullen, Thomas Jefferson: Writings on the Constitution, THis CONSTrrUTION,
Winter 1986, at 27, 32. See also AGRSTO, supra note 19, at 83.
107. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENnON OF 1787 85 (M. Farrand ed.,
1966).
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